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Publications
Subject(s)
Health and environment; Information technology and systems
Keyword(s)
Public health, epidemic control, information design, strategic behavior
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.
© 2021, INFORMS
Journal Article
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
Santiago R. Balseiro, Ozan Candogan, Huseyin Gurkan
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Intermediary problems, mechanism design, internet advertising, extensive form games, second-price auction, multi-stage intermediation
Journal Article
Operations Research 67 (5): ii–iv, 1209–1502
Santiago R. Balseiro, Huseyin Gurkan, Peng Sun (2019)
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Product and operations management
Keyword(s)
Dynamic mechanism design, social efficiency, multi-agent games, resource allocation without money
We consider a principal repeatedly allocating a single resource in each period to one of multiple agents, whose values are private, without relying on monetary payments over an infinite horizon with discounting. We design a dynamic mechanism without monetary transfers, which induces agents to report their values truthfully in each period via promises/threats of future favorable/unfavorable allocations. We show that our mechanism asymptotically achieves the first-best efficient allocation (the welfare-maximizing allocation as if values are public) as agents become more patient and provide sharp characterizations of convergence rates to first best as a function of the discount factor. In particular, in the case of two agents we prove that the convergence rate of our mechanism is optimal, i.e., no other mechanism can converge faster to first best.
Copyright © 2019, INFORMS
Volume
67
Journal Pages
ii–iv, 1209–1502
Journal Article
Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 68 (July): 38–57
Huseyin Gurkan, Sinan Gürel, M. Selim Aktürk (2016)
Keyword(s)
Airline scheduling, aircraft fleeting and routing, cruise time controllability, second order cone programming
Volume
68
Journal Pages
38–57