Skip to main content
Publications
Journal Article
The Journal of Law and Economics 55 (1): 189–216
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
telecommunications, access regulation, unbundling, investment
JEL Code(s)
C51, L59, L96
We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants' and incumbents' investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher incumbents' investments encourage provision of regulated access.
With permission of the University of Chicago Press
Volume
55
Journal Pages
189–216
Journal Article
European Competition Journal 7 (3): 421–431
Jakub Kałużny, Rainer Nitsche, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2011)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
market definition, shopping centre, externalities, characteristics approach
Volume
7
Journal Pages
421–431
Journal Article
Empirica 38 (3): 287–314
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy, merger control, market definition, state aid, regulation
Volume
38
Journal Pages
287–314
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
antitrust law, horizontal anticompetitive practices, quantification of damages
JEL Code(s)
L12, L41, K21, K41, C10
Volume
6
Journal Pages
595–618
Journal Article
Antitrust Law Journal 76 (2): 569–584
Luke M. Froeb, Paul A. Pautler, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2009)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
decision making, functional organization
Volume
76
Journal Pages
569–584
Journal Article
The Journal of Law and Economics 50 (3): 455–489
Tomaso Duso, Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2007)
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
merger control, European Commission, political economy, lobbying, stock market data
JEL Code(s)
L4, K21, C25, D78
The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of European Union (EU) merger control decisions.We consider a sample of 167 EU mergers between 1990 and 2002 and evaluate their competitive consequences by the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to he merging firms. We then account for the discrepancies between the actual and optimal decisions as indicated by the stock market in terms of the political economy surrounding the cases. Our results suggest that the commission's decisions cannot be solely accounted for as protecting consumer surplus. The institutional and political environment does matter. As far as influence is concerned, however, our data suggest that the commission's decisions are not sensitive to firms' interests. Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors-such as market definition and procedural aspects, as well as country and industry effects-do play a significant role.
With permission of the University of Chicago Press
Volume
50
Journal Pages
455–489
Journal Article
The Economic Journal 117 (522): 1122–1144
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Ralph B. Siebert, Mihkel M. Tombak (2007)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
technology
In this article, we examine why it is difficult to induce firms to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We examine various incentives and disincentives for RJV formation by estimating an endogeneous switching model using data from the US National Cooperative Research Act. The empirical findings support hypotheses that firms of different sizes have disincentives to form RJVs and that cost-sharing is an important incentive for RJV participation.
© The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2007
Volume
117
Journal Pages
1122–1144
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Volume
4
Journal Pages
30–32
Journal Article
Review of Industrial Organization 29 (4): 281–304
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Oliver Stehmann (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy, effects-based approach, antitrust, state aids, mergers
Volume
29
Journal Pages
281–304
Journal Article
The Journal of Industrial Economics 54 (3): 351–368
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Zhentang Zhang (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy
This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price-cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two-equation set-up (demand and first-order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price-cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976-1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price-cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
Volume
54
Journal Pages
351–368
Journal Article
Journal of Public Economics 90 (6): 1133–1153
Olivier Cadot, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Andreas Stephan (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
growth, infrastructure, political economy, lobbying, France
JEL Code(s)
D72, D78, O40
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. By contrast, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
90
Journal Pages
1133–1153
Journal Article
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 7 (3): 355–372
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Oliver Stehmann (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
regulation, merger policy, state aid and anti-trust
Over the last decade, sector-specific regulation has been used to promote competition in European network industries. Given that competition is still rudimentary in some sectors, this process is still not finished. As a result, Member States have continued to remove regulatory barriers in network industries. This paper discusses the experiences from the energy, telecommunications and transport sectors by focussing on the role of European competition policy. We review a number of important case decisions in merger control, anti-trust and state aid control and discuss their implications for market opening. We conclude that a more holistic approach is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of competition policy instruments, i.e. a closer co-ordination of competition instruments, in particular state aid and anti-trust/merger policy.
© Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
Volume
7
Journal Pages
355–372
Journal Article
European Competition Journal 2 (1): 9–28
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Miguel de la Mano (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
mergers, acquisitions, restructuring, voting, proxy contests, corporate governance, antitrust law, antitrust issues and policies
Volume
2
Journal Pages
9–28
Journal Article
American Economic Review 96 (1): 321–338
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Frode Steen (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy
There are relatively few empirical studies on the workings of a cartel. The primary reason for this is that cartels are often illegal and therefore data are difficult to obtain. Even though antitrust agencies sometimes compile detailed information on cartels, strict confidentiality rules often keep data from academic research. A notable exception is the seminal work by Robert H. Porter (1983), which investigates price wars in a railroad cartel operating in the United States in the late nineteenth century.' More recently, David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (1998) use data from 1892 to 1914 of the American sugar industry, where the American Sugar Refining Company controlled (through acquisition) 95 percent of the U.S. sugar market by 1895. Finally, the so-called Lysine cartel, an industry producing feed additive used to ensure the proper growth of livestock, has provided more information on the workings of cartels' international settings (see James M. Griffin, 2001).
Copyright © 2006 by the American Economic Association.
Volume
96
Journal Pages
321–338
Journal Article
International Journal of Industrial Organization 23 (9/10): 829–848
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2005)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
merger control, political economy, antitrust policy, capture
JEL Code(s)
L40, H11
This paper considers the political economy environment that an antitrust agency is operating in and asks under what circumstances a consumer surplus standard yields higher welfare than a welfare standard. In particular, we address how institutional settings-such as transparency and accountability-interact with the choice of an appropriate standard. We consider a framework in which the antitrust agency can be influenced by third parties (at a cost in terms of real resources) and in which the agency is imperfectly monitored. A welfare comparison between the two standards reveals that neither standard dominates. The consumer surplus standard is attractive relative to a welfare standard, when lobbying is efficient, when accountability is low, where mergers are large and when a marginal increase in merger size is highly profitable.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
23
Journal Pages
829–848
Journal Article
European Economic Review 49 (6): 1431–1450
Pierre Mohnen, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2005)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
supermodularity, innovation, CISI
JEL Code(s)
L5, O31, O38
This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a discrete test of supermodularity in innovation policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. We apply our test to two types of innovation decisions: to innovate or not, and if so, by how much. We find that the evidence regarding the existence of complementarity in innovation policies depends on the phase of innovation that is targeted (getting firms innovative or increasing their innovation intensity) as well as on the particular pair of policies that is being considered. The two phases of the innovation process, i.e. the probability of becoming an innovator and the intensity of innovation, are subject to different constraints. Interestingly, there seems to be a need to adopt a package of policies to make firms innovate, while a more targeted choice among policies is necessary to make them more innovative.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
49
Journal Pages
1431–1450
Journal Article
Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (1): 47–58
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Zhentang Zhang (2005)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
socialists, soft budget constraint, transitional economies
JEL Code(s)
L13, L30
Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide social goods at the same time that they are competing with private firms. This paper analyzes the impact of such bundling on the provision of private and social goods focusing on the inability of politicians to commit not to bail out firms experiencing financial trouble. This soft budget constraint problem results in firms not becoming efficient in the private goods market. We show that more competition in the private goods market can lead to less efficiency in such environments. As a potential solution to the soft budget constraint problem, we consider unbundling, i.e., the separation of social good provision from the private good, and analyze the benefits and the costs.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
33
Journal Pages
47–58
Journal Article
Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2–3): 526–535
Eugenio Miravete, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2004)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy
JEL Code(s)
D43, D82, L96
This paper provides a structural interpretation to the estimates of the shape and position of nonlinear tariffs. We focus on the evaluation of price- cost margins, and thus we need to identify marginal cost from an equilibrium model of nonlinear pricing competition. We estimate these price-cost margins using quarterly data from the early U.S. cellular telephone industry between 1984 and 1988. Our results indicate that the margins are increased under duopoly, due to a significant reduction in marginal costs. Moreover, we find that the price- cost margins vary over the consumption levels and that low end users are subject to higher price-cost margins than high-end users. The impact of competition further increases the margins in the low-end user segment, relative to high-end users. In that sense the benefits of competition, which are largely due to increased efficiencies, are passed on relatively more to high-end users. We also show that these findings are robust even if one includes a number of observable market demand and cost variables.
© 2004 European Economic Association
Volume
2
Journal Pages
526–535
Journal Article
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 3 (4): 235–249
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Damien J. Neven (2003)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
merger control, antitrust, international conflict
JEL Code(s)
K21, L49
Volume
3
Journal Pages
235–249
Journal Article
Economics Letters 81 (1): 67–71
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Tomaso Duso (2003)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
deregulation, telecommunications, political economy
JEL Code(s)
D7, L5, L8
This paper presents empirical evidence regarding the effect of endogenous deregulation on productivity. We find that treating deregulation across OECD countries as an exogenous event overestimates the competitive impact of deregulation on productivity by as much as 40%.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
81
Journal Pages
67–71
Journal Article
Netnomics 5 (1): 5–20
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (2003)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
merger, new economy, competition policy, international conflict
JEL Code(s)
L1, L4
Volume
5
Journal Pages
5–20
Journal Article
American Economic Review 91 (4): 909–923
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Leonard Waverman (2001)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
competition policy
JEL Code(s)
O57, O47, L69
In this paper we investigate how telecommunications infrastructure affects economic growth. We use evidence from 21 OECD countries over a 20-year period to examine the impacts that telecommunications developments may have had. We jointly estimate a micromodel for telecommunication investment with a macro production function. Wefind evidence of a significant positive causal link, especially when a critical mass of telecommunications infrastructure is present. Interestingly, the critical mass appears to be at a level of telecommunications infrastructure that is near universal service.
Copyright © 2001 by the American Economic Association.
Volume
91
Journal Pages
909–923
Journal Article
International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (6): 845–865
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Robin C. Sickles (2000)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy
JEL Code(s)
L5, L93
In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for competition in two variables: capacity and prices. The model has a two-stage setup. In the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a product-differentiated, price setting game in the second stage. Since costs are endogenized through the first stage, this has important implications for the measurement of market power in the product market. In particular, simpler one-stage specifications would result in a bias in the measurement of market power, which can be linked to the taxonomy for two-stage games given in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) [Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1984. ''The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look'', American Economic Review (Paper and Proceedings) 74, 361-366]. We then estimate this model - demand, cost (short and long run), and conduct - for the European Airline Industry using data for the period of 1976-1990. We perform a number of specification tests and reject a simple one-stage specification in favor of our two-stage set-up. In particular, we find that some degree of market power in the product market exists. However, market conduct in the two-stage set-up is significantly less collusive than in the more widely employed one-stage specification, which is consistent with the direction of bias in puppy-dog games. This illustrates that collusiveness of firms' market conduct in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is not accounted for.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
18
Journal Pages
845–865
Journal Article
European Economic Review 44 (4–6): 845–855
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2000)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy, merger control, allocation of jurisdiction
JEL Code(s)
L4, K21, F2
In this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of institution design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency. We focus on the first element of the trade-off and on merger control. We first point out that the current framework of public international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of jurisdiction. We then consider various allocations of jurisdictions in a stylised model of international merger control which attempts to capture the essential features of the objectives being pursued and of the procedures being implemented in the major jurisdictions. We find that in this framework, much of the scope for conflict disappears. The fact that conflicts actually often arise in global industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust authorities are not supposed to pursue. We also find that the allocation of jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the final outcome.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
44
Journal Pages
845–855
Journal Article
International Journal of Industrial Organization 17 (7): 1059–1074
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1999)
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
banking, oligopoly, aggregation
JEL Code(s)
L1, L5
The objective of this study is to analyze competition in the European banking industry in light of the changing regulatory frameworks to which banks are exposed. We focus on the provision of mortgages to households and loans to the corporate sectors in seven European countries. We develop and estimate an aggregate model for the European banking industry which controls for asymmetries in market structure. We reject non-cooperative Nash behavior in favor of more collusive cartel-like conduct. In addition, we provide some evidence that the degree of coordination among banks in the household market has fallen over the period. Such evolution can presumably be associated with the widespread deregulation that took place during the 1980s.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
17
Journal Pages
1059–1074
Journal Article
Strategic Management Journal 20 (1): 1–14
Karel Cool, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Benoit Leleux (1999)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
potential competition, drug industry, industry profitability, market share, rivalry
This paper estimates the effects of actual and potential rivalry on profitability of firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the 20-year period 1963-82. The results show that during the 1960s actual rivalry among the sampled firms did not materially affect firm profitability, but that during the 1970s competition among incumbents had an increasingly adverse effect on their profitability. The results also show that potential competition significantly reduced drug firms' profitability during the entire 20-year period.
© 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume
20
Journal Pages
1–14
Journal Article
Applied Economics Letters 5 (5): 275–279
Carole Bonanni, Jean Dermine, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1998)
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
competition policy
Volume
5
Journal Pages
275–279
Journal Article
The RAND Journal of Economics 28 (2): 304–322
Philip M. Parker, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1997)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy
With the deregulation of the telecommunications industry, a variety of industry structures have been created in hopes of increasing competition. One example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the United States, where the FCC created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets. Taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment, we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes. We find that cross-ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining noncompetitive prices.
© 1997 RAND
Volume
28
Journal Pages
304–322
Journal Article
European Economic Review 40 (3–5): 531–539
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Bernard Sinclair-Désgagné (1996)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
imitation, organizational inertia, multi-product duopoly
JEL Code(s)
L10
An important issue in corporate strategy is to explain persistent differences in conduct and performance among close competitors within an industry. While IO economists generally seek technology and market-based explanations, firm theorists and business policy scholars rather look for historical and organizational reasons. The paper first summarizes recent findings along these two approaches. It then studies sources of persistent differences between two firms competing à la Cournot on two identical markets. In this context both types of explanations are found to matter. We show that the firms' respective capabilities (i.e. the parameters that determine their cost of producing the two goods) would diverge only if some difference in the firms' respective initial capabilities exists or there is an appropriate combination of organizational inertia (the cost for updating current capabilities) and market conditions.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
40
Journal Pages
531–539
Journal Article
European Economic Review 40 (3–5): 933–940
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1996)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
competition, rent sharing, airline industry
JEL Code(s)
L40, L93
To the extent that product market competition affects managerial incentives to control costs, price-cost margins offer a poor guide to the evaluation of market power. We propose a method to evaluate simultaneously both market power and its pass through on cost. We focus on rent sharing between unions and management as a mechanism through which costs are endogenised. We develop and estimate a structural model of competition where wages are endogenously determined in the first stage, with a price-setting market game following in the second stage. This structural model is then estimated using data for 8 European airlines from 1976-1990. We find a strong support for the hypothesis that lax competition induces extensive rent sharing through excessive wages.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
40
Journal Pages
933–940
Journal Article
European Journal of Operational Research 80 (3): 508–518
David Good, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Robin C. Sickles (1995)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
productivity
In this paper we examine the performance of the eight largest European and the eight largest American airlines during the period 1976-1986. During this period the American industry was deregulated and the European industry's competitive posture was significantly liberalized. Two alternative methodologies for identifying productive efficiency are used - a parametric one using statistical estimation and a nonparametric one using linear programming. We find that were European carriers under deregulation to be as productively efficient as their American counterparts, the European industry would save approximately $4 billion per year (in 1986 dollars).
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
80
Journal Pages
508–518
Journal Article
Naval Research Logistics 41 (3): 377–394
Taekwon Kim, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mihkel M. Tombak (1994)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
technology
This article examines a game of multiproduct technology adoption. We consider a duopoly model in which firms choose when to switch from a traditional single-product technology to a more flexible and more expensive multiproduct technology. The multiproduct technology allows a firm to invade the other firm's market, creating a more competitive environment and reducing profits. We analyze this investment decision as a game of timing using two different equilibrium concepts. First, we utilize the silent equilibrium concept, where firms commit at time zero to a switching time. This concept would be applicable to situations where firms cannot observe each other's actions, or when the implementation of the technology requires long lead times and the investment decision is private information. Using this notion we find that both firms adopt the multiproduct technology simultaneously within a certain time interval. We then characterize this time interval in terms of cost and demand conditions. We also derive conditions under which sequential adoption of the multiproduct technology occurs. The second concept used is that of noisy equilibrium, where firms cannot precommit themselves to an adoption time. This concept is appropriate when investment decisions are common knowledge. In this case a firm can credibly threaten to immediately follow suit if the other firm decides to adopt. This threat is sufficient to ensure the collusive outcome where neither firm adopts the flexible technology.
© 1994 Wiley Periodicals, Inc., A Wiley Company
Volume
41
Journal Pages
377–394
Journal Article
The RAND Journal of Economics 24 (4): 479–502
Murugappa Krishnan, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1993)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy
We study an entry game under perfect information, with the salient feature that capacity is resalable. We show that an inability to precommit (to final output) can help rather than hurt. In contrast to other analyses of limited commitment (e.g., Maskin-Tirole (1988)), which do not specify the sources of-or reasons for-limits to commitment, we assume that such limits arisefrom the resalable nature of capacity, and are led naturally to a consideration of additional strategic variables that can improve the incumbent's position in our model. Resalability increases the complexity of the incumbent's precommitment problem, but it also furnishes her with an additional source of power-in our model, the price at which to resell capacity. While a capacity resale market enables capacity to be shared, and can help anticompetitive behavior, the very existence of a resale market can generate an incentive for a much larger initial level of investment, to the point where the overall equilibrium outcome can be more competitive.
© 1993 RAND
Volume
24
Journal Pages
479–502
Journal Article
Economic Policy 8 (17): 402–432
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Leonard Waverman (1993)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
competition policy
© 1993 Maison des Sciences de l'Homme
Volume
8
Journal Pages
402–432
Journal Article
The Economic Journal 103 (419): 1028–1041
David Good, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Robin C. Sickles (1993)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
competition policy
The last fifteen years has seen a proliferation of deregulation in transportation industries throughout the world; in the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. While it is easy to view the European liberalisation of civil aviation as a latecomer to this trend, it takes place in by far the most difficult environment thus far. All previous deregulatory efforts have been solely domestic in nature. Even where trade between nations has been liberalised (such as in the North American Free Trade Agreement), transportation sectors have been explicitly excluded. While deregulation in individual countries has proceeded quickly, even though the various legislation provided for phased processes, the politics in Europe are likely to move the process along much more slowly. This expected sluggishness is due to two factors: the close association of the major European carriers with national governments, and differences in the competitive postures of these airlines.
© 1993 Royal Economic Society
Volume
103
Journal Pages
1028–1041
Journal Article
Journal of Productivity Analysis 4 (1/2): 115–125
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Zhentang Zhang, Ishaq Nadiri, Robin C. Sickles (1993)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Europe, United States, deregulation, air carriers
Volume
4
Journal Pages
115–125
Journal Article
Management Science 39 (1): 107–114
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mihkel M. Tombak (1993)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), oligopolistic competition, product differentiation
This paper examines the implications of market structure on investment in flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). We analyze a two-stage game, in which firms choose between a flexible and a less flexible technology in the first stage, then choose production quantities in the second stage. In equilibrium, a large proportion of FMS firms is associated with more concentrated markets. Our model predicts that a larger market and/or a more differentiated product results in a higher proportion of FMS firms being sustained. These predictions are empirically supported using cross-section industry level data from both the US and Japan.
© 1993 INFORMS
Volume
39
Journal Pages
107–114
Journal Article
Energy Journal 13 (3): 185–206
Landis Gabel, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1992)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
environment, trade, transport, transportation
JEL Code(s)
L910, Q250, F150
Volume
13
Journal Pages
185–206
Journal Article
The Journal of Industrial Economics 40 (2): 233–235
Taekwon Kim, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mihkel M. Tombak (1992)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
technology
In a recent article in this journal, Roller and Tombak [1990] analyse the strategic choice of modern flexible production technologies. They develop a two-stage game in which firms choose between a flexible technology and a dedicated technology in the first stage and subsequently choose output. This note corrects an error in one of the graphs in that paper, provides an interpretation of the new graph and extends the analysis by allowing for mixed strategies and complementary products.
© 1992 Wiley
Volume
40
Journal Pages
233–235
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Intermediation 2 (1): 83–93
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Jean Dermine (1992)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
French mutual funds, economies of scale
This paper evaluates the economies of scale and scope in the French mutual funds (SICAV) industry. This segment of the financial sector offers the unique characteristic that some firms specialize, while others supply several products. The results suggest economies of scale and scope for small institutions and diseconomies for larger firms. An appropriate size for a diversified company is in the range of FF 2.9 billion.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
2
Journal Pages
83–93
Journal Article
Managerial and Decision Economics 13 (1): 83–85
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mihkel M. Tombak (1992)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
competitiveness
The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity produced not only the book under review here but also several other documents on the same topic. The com- mission was an interdisciplinary team consisting of seventeen scientists of disciplines ranging from nuclear engineering to political science, with a staff of 32 research associates and others. A further 33 scientists formed the subcommittees, again from various disciplines, and mostly from MIT. ...
© 1992 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume
13
Journal Pages
83–85
Journal Article
International Journal of Production Economics 23 (2–3): 197–204
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mihkel M. Tombak (1991)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
technology
In this paper we examine the innovative manufacturing technologies known as "Flexible Manufacturing Systems" (FMS). We begin with a description of these systems and the industries in which they are used. We then review several theoretical models which analyze the decision process to invest in FMS. These models illustrate the importance of such market factors as product differentiation, differences in cost and market size, degree of competition, and market dynamics. In the second part of the paper we present some new empirical evidence using a database of almost 3,000 business units. This empirical evidence is shown to be consistent with the theory.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
23
Journal Pages
197–204
Journal Article
European Economic Review 35 (6): 1295–1309
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1991)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Europe
The objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which the four large European countries are already integrated. We study trade flows in the manufacturing sector (disaggregated in 29 industries) for the period 1975-1985 within the EC and between EC members and the rest of the world. First, we do not find any strong evidence that integration has receded; rather we tentatively conclude that integration has proceeded alongside integration with the rest of the world (except for the food industry). Second, we estimate an econometric model which accounts for trade flows (within the EC and with the rest of the world). We observe that non-tariff barriers hamper trade between Europe and the rest of the world significantly more than intra-European trade.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
35
Journal Pages
1295–1309
Journal Article
Applied Economics 22 (12): 1661–1674
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
economics, macroeconomics
Volume
22
Journal Pages
1661–1674
Journal Article
Economics Letters 33 (4): 375–383
Murugappa Krishnan, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1990)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
regulation
This paper examines regulation in markets where firms choose price-liability combinations. Our work implies that a recently suggested regulatory rule, restricting the maximum liability that can be assumed, does not increase consumer welfare. We also study a rule inspired by the German audit market, in which maximum liability is restricted but only as a multiple of the price. This reduction in the dimensionality of firm's strategy space is shown to reduce consumer welfare, if the liability-price multiple is smaller than the multiple observed under no regulation. However, even larger liability-price multiples could leave consumers worse off.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
33
Journal Pages
375–383
Journal Article
The Journal of Industrial Economics 38 (4): 417–431
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Mihkel M. Tombak (1990)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
technology
This paper examines the market conditions under which firms would choose a more flexible production technology with respect to product design. We use a two-stage game in which firms choose between flexible and less flexible production technologies in the first stage and subsequently choose output. We find that consumers would benefit from the introduction of flexible production technologies. In our model, we also find that the production technology game is a Prisoner's Dilemma when firms invest in FMS. We derive the conditions under which the resulting equilibria are efficient.
© 1990 Wiley
Volume
38
Journal Pages
417–431
Journal Article
Review of Economics and Statistics 72 (2): 202–210
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
competition policy
Volume
72
Journal Pages
202–210
Journal Article
The Journal of Industrial Economics 37 (3): 303–314
Anil B. Deolalikar, Lars-Hendrik Röller (1989)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
innovation
This paper attempts to study simultaneously the production and impact of patenting in a less-developed country, using panel firm-level data for the period 1975-79 for India. Our results suggest that, despite the limited protection of intellectual property rights in India, patenting is associated with a significant increase in total factor productivity growth at the firm level. After controlling for unobserved fixed firm effects, R D manpower appears to be the only input which influences significantly the probability of patenting.
© 1989 Wiley
Volume
37
Journal Pages
303–314