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Publications
Journal Article
Theory and Decision 81 (4): 571–579
Michael Melles, Rainer Nitsche (2016)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Multimarket firms, entry, predation, reputation
Volume
81
Journal Pages
571–579
Journal Article
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 6 (1): 48–53
Lars Wiethaus, Rainer Nitsche (2015)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Volume
6
Journal Pages
48–53
Journal Article
Information Economics and Policy 28: 39–56
Lukasz Grzybowskia, Rainer Nitsche, Frank Verboven, Lars Wiethaus (2014)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Broadband, market definition, multinomial logit, mixed logit
JEL Code(s)
L13, L43, L93
This paper uses a rich survey of 6446 households in Slovakia to estimate price elasticities of demand for Internet access, and draw implications for market definition. We estimate a mixed logit model, in which households choose between different broadband technologies: DSL, cable modem, fibre, WiFi and mobile. We find that a number of household characteristics influence the technology choices, and there is also significant unobserved heterogeneity. Demand for Internet access is highly price sensitive. The price elasticity of demand for DSL is −3.02, which falls in the middle of the range of elasticities for the other technologies. Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand at the level of all fixed broadband technologies (DSL + cable modem + fibre + WiFi) is equal to −1.98. For a reasonable range of profit margins, this estimate implies that mobile broadband should be included in the relevant antitrust market of fixed broadband. Our findings have implications for competition policy in Central and Eastern European countries where due to poor copper networks mobile broadband is an important alternative to fixed broadband.
Volume
28
Journal Pages
39–56
Journal Article
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 3 (4): 409–414
Rainer Nitsche, Lars Wiethaus (2012)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Volume
3
Journal Pages
409–414
Journal Article
European Competition Journal 7 (3): 421–431
Jakub Kałużny, Rainer Nitsche, Lars-Hendrik Röller (2011)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
market definition, shopping centre, externalities, characteristics approach
Volume
7
Journal Pages
421–431
Journal Article
International Journal of Industrial Organization 29 (2): 263–272
Rainer Nitsche, Lars Wiethaus (2011)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Regulation, competition, telecommunications, broadband, strategic investment
JEL Code(s)
L51, L96, L10, K23
This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long run incremental costs regulation. Simulations indicate that risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, regulatory holiday and long run incremental costs, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity.
Volume
29
Journal Pages
263–272
Journal Article
The Journal of Industrial Economics 58 (4): 794–817
Albert Banal-Estanol, Paul Heidhues, Rainer Nitsche, Jo Seldeslachts (2010)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
takeovers, merger waves, defense tactics, screening
JEL Code(s)
D21, D80, L11
In our paper, the target of a proposed merger, by setting a reserve price, is able to screen prospective acquirers according to their (expected) ability to generate merger-specific synergies. Both empirical evidence and many merger models suggest that the difference between high and low-synergy mergers becomes smaller during booms. Thus, a target's opportunity cost for sorting out relatively less fitting acquirers increases and, hence, targets screen less tightly during booms, which leads to a hike in merger activity. Our screening mechanism not only predicts that merger activity is intense during booms and subdued during recessions but is also consistent with other stylized facts about takeovers and generates novel testable predictions.
© The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Volume
58
Journal Pages
794–817
Journal Article
European State Aid Law Quarterly 5 (1): 23–34
Paul Heidhues, Rainer Nitsche (2006)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
state aid control, competition policy
Volume
5
Journal Pages
23–34