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Journal Article
Organizational Research Methods
Eric Quintane, Aaron Schecter
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Social network analysis, network dynamics, Relational Events Model
The Relational Event Model (REM) solves a problem for organizational researchers who have access to sequences of time stamped interactions. It enables them to estimate statistical models without collapsing the data into cross-sectional panels, which removes timing and sequence information. However, there is little guidance in the extant literature regarding issues that may affect REM’s power, precision and accuracy: How many events or actors are needed? How large should the risk set be? How should statistics be scaled? To gain insights into these issues, we conduct a series of experiments using simulated sequences of relational events under different conditions and using different sampling and scaling strategies. We also provide an empirical example using email communications in a real-life context. Our results indicate that, in most cases, the power and precision levels of REMs are good, making it a strong explanatory model. However, REM suffers from issues of accuracy that can be severe in certain cases, making it a poor predictive model. We provide a set of practical recommendations to guide researcher’s use of REMs in organizational research.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
Journal Article
Industry and Innovation
Henry Sauermann, Susanne Beck, Carsten Bergenholtz, Marcel Bogers, Tiare-Maria Brasseur, Marie Louise Conradsen, Diletta Di Marco et al.
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Open innovation in Science, openness, collaboration in science, Open Science, interdisciplinary research
Openness and collaboration in scientific research are attracting increasing attention from scholars and practitioners alike. However, a common understanding of these phenomena is hindered by disciplinary boundaries and disconnected research streams. We link dispersed knowledge on Open Innovation, Open Science, and related concepts such as Responsible Research and Innovation by proposing a unifying Open Innovation in Science (OIS) Research Framework. This framework captures the antecedents, contingencies, and consequences of open and collaborative practices along the entire process of generating and disseminating scientific insights and translating them into innovation. Moreover, it elucidates individual-, team-, organisation-, field-, and society‐level factors shaping OIS practices. To conceptualise the framework, we employed a collaborative approach involving 47 scholars from multiple disciplines, highlighting both tensions and commonalities between existing approaches. The OIS Research Framework thus serves as a basis for future research, informs policy discussions, and provides guidance to scientists and practitioners.
Keyword(s)
Price competition, price dispersion, unique equilibrium
JEL Code(s)
D43, L11
We study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms that sell a homogeneous good to consumers who are characterized by the number of prices they are exogenously aware of. Our setting subsumes many employed in the literature over the last several decades. We show there is a unique equilibrium if and only if there exist some consumers who are aware of exactly two prices. The equilibrium we derive is in symmetric mixed strategies. Furthermore, when there are no consumers aware of exactly two prices, we show there is an uncountable-infinity of asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. Our results show the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium. We also show that the commonly-sought symmetric equilibrium (which also nests the textbookBertrand pure strategy equilibrium as a special case) is robust to perturbations in consumer behaviour, while the asymmetric equilibria are not.
© 2020 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal Article
Review of Economics and Statistics
Fabian Gaessler, Stefan Wagner
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
patents, drugs, data exclusivity, clinical trials
JEL Code(s)
K41, L24, L65, O31, O32, O34
Journal Article
Organization Science
Paola Criscuolo, Linus Dahlander, Thorsten Grohsjean, Ammon Salter
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Selection, novelty, decision-making, innovation, panel
This paper examines how groups fall prey to the sequence effect in decision-making about R&D projects. We propose that the temporal sequence of selection matters in R&D—even when it should be completely irrelevant—because projects that appear in a sequence following a funded project are themselves less likely to receive funding. Building on the idea that individuals are more likely to suffer from such bias when attention is limited, we develop new theory examining three group-level moderators that may influence attention among panel members and thereby strengthen or weaken the sequence effect, namely the timing of panel meeting, the workload of the person introducing the project to the panel, and the differences in expertise between the panel members and the introducer. We test these conjectures using a randomization in sequence order from several rounds of R&D project selection at a leading professional service firm. We find robust support for the existence of sequencing effects in R&D as well as moderating effects. These findings have broader implications for the selection of innovation ideas and R&D management as they suggest that a previously overlooked dimension affects selection outcomes.
© 2021, INFORMS
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Reinforcing processes, quality, performance evaluation, movie industry, luck
When does market success indicate superior merit? We show that when consumer choices between products with equal prices depend on quality but also on past popularity, more popular products are not necessarily of higher quality. Rather, a medium level of popularity may be associated with lower quality than lower levels of popularity. Using a formal model we show that this kind of non-monotonic association occurs when reinforcing processes are strong. More generally, a dip can occur when outcomes depend on both quality and resources and the latter are allocated bimodally, with some being given a lot of resources and most receiving little. Empirically, we illustrate that such a dip occurs in the association between movie theater sales and ratings. The presence of a dip in the outcome-quality association complicates learning from market outcomes and evaluation of individuals and new ventures, challenges the legitimacy of stratification systems, and creates opportunities for sophisticated evaluators who understand the dip.
© 2021, INFORMS
Journal Article
Review of Accounting Studies
Frank Ecker, Jennifer Francis, Per Olsson, Katherine Schipper
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
Association tests, non-random sampling, equity, returns, distribution matching, multiple imputation, resampling
JEL Code(s)
M41
Journal Article
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance
Neil Bhattacharya, Per Olsson, Hyungshin Park
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
Analyst forecast, earnings announcement, investor sophistication, under-reaction
We decompose analysts’ earnings forecast error into predictable and unpredictable components, and investigate individual vis-à-vis institutional investors’ reactions to each of these components. We find that in the immediate post-earnings announcement window, only individuals under-react to the predictable component, while both individuals and institutions under-react to the unpredictable component. The price drift in this window is driven primarily by investors’ under-reaction to the unpredictable component. This drift remains highly significant in larger firms and intensifies in firms with complex financial reports, suggesting that it likely represents the slow and noisy process of price discovery. Around the next quarterly earnings announcement, only individuals under-react to the previous quarter’s predictable component, and this fixation drives the entire price drift in this window. This drift disappears in larger firms, and gets exacerbated in firms with greater forecast error autocorrelations, suggesting that it is likely attributable to incomplete processing of earnings information by individuals.
​​​​With permission of SAGE Publishing
ISSN (Online)
2160-4061
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Congress, ideology, influence, social capital, status
Prior research assumes that high-status actors have greater organizational influence than lower-status ones, that is, it is easier for the former to get their ideas and initiatives adopted by the organization than it is for the latter. Drawing from the literature on ideology, we posit that the status–influence link is contingent on actors’ ideological position. Specifically, status confers organizational influence to the degree that the focal actor is ideologically mainstream. The more an actor’s ideology deviates from the mainstream the less will her status translate into increased organizational influence. We find support for this hypothesis using data on the work of legislators in the House of Representatives in the United States Congress. By illuminating how and under what conditions status leads to increased influence, this study qualifies and extends current understandings of the role of status in organizations.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
Journal Article
Management Science
Stanley Baiman, Mirko S. Heinle, Richard Saouma
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Overinvestment, capital budgeting, resource allocation, information asymmetry, optimal contracting
The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm’s optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is always optimal to overinvest relative to first best, and the most efficient agent may not earn rents, even when a less efficient agent does.
© 2020, INFORMS