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Journal Article
Review of Economics and Statistics
Fabian Gaessler, Stefan Wagner
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
patents, drugs, data exclusivity, clinical trials
JEL Code(s)
K41, L24, L65, O31, O32, O34
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Congress, ideology, influence, social capital, status
Prior research assumes that high-status actors have greater organizational influence than lower-status ones, that is, it is easier for the former to get their ideas and initiatives adopted by the organization than it is for the latter. Drawing from the literature on ideology, we posit that the status–influence link is contingent on actors’ ideological position. Specifically, status confers organizational influence to the degree that the focal actor is ideologically mainstream. The more an actor’s ideology deviates from the mainstream the less will her status translate into increased organizational influence. We find support for this hypothesis using data on the work of legislators in the House of Representatives in the United States Congress. By illuminating how and under what conditions status leads to increased influence, this study qualifies and extends current understandings of the role of status in organizations.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
Journal Article
Operations Research
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Peng Sun
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Sequential decision making, time pressure, information search, Bayesian inference
Arrow et al. (1949) introduced the first sequential search problem, “where at each stage the options available are to stop and take a definite action or to continue sampling for more information." We study how time pressure in the form of task accumulation may affect this decision problem. To that end, we consider a search problem where the decision maker (DM) faces a stream of random decision tasks to be treated one at a time, and accumulate when not attended to. We formulate the problem of managing this form of pressure as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, and characterize the corresponding optimal policy. We find that the DM needs to alleviate this pressure very differently depending on how the search on the current task has unfolded thus far. As the search progresses, the DM is less and less willing to sustain high levels of workloads in the beginning and end of the search, but actually increases the maximum workload she is willing to handle in the middle of the process. The DM manages this workload by first making a priori decisions to release some accumulated tasks, and later by aborting the current search and deciding based on her updated belief. This novel search strategy critically depends on the DM's prior belief about the tasks, and stems, in part, from an effect related to the decision ambivalence. These findings are robust to various extensions of our basic set-up.
© 2019, INFORMS
Book Chapter
In The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security, edited by Paul Cornish, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Secondary Title
The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security
ISBN
9780198800682
Journal Article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (2): 1019–1054
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Sophistication, naivete, first-degree, price, discrimination, third-degree price discrimination, big data, privacy
JEL Code(s)
D21, D49, D69, L19
We initiate the study of naivete-based discrimination, the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers’ naivete. Knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm's willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer's mistakes, so naivete-based discrimination is not Pareto-improving, can be Pareto-damaging, and often lowers total welfare when classical preference-based discrimination does not. Moreover, the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature: the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers. If the distortion is homogenous across naive and sophisticated consumers, then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition, naivete-based discrimination lowers total welfare. In contrast, if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers, then perfect naivete-based discrimination maximizes social welfare, although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare. And if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers, then naivete-based discrimination has no effect on welfare. We identify applications for each of these cases. In our primary example, a credit market with present-biased borrowers, firms lend more than socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay, creating a homogenous distortion. The condition for naivete-based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence.
This is an open access article.
Volume
132
Journal Pages
1019–1054
Journal Article
Review of Economic Studies 84 (1): 323–356
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi, Takeshi Murooka
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
JEL Code(s)
D14, D18, D21
We analyze conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that “bad" products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than “good" products. Specifically, (1) in a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms, a deceptive equilibrium - in which firms hide additional prices - does not exist and firms make zero profits. But perversely, (2) if the product is socially wasteful, then a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, (3) in a market with multiple products, since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison, it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers. We apply our framework to the mutual-fund and credit-card markets, arguing that it explains a number of empirical findings regarding these industries.
This is an open access article.
Volume
84
Journal Pages
323–356
ESMT Working Paper
ESMT Working Paper No. 21-02
Hans W. Friederiszick, Alexis Walckiers (2021)
An increasing number of countries have introduced some form of prohibition of abuses of economic dependence or broadened the scope of their existing legislation. Yet, very little has been written on the economics of economic dependence, that is on economic reasoning, tools or metrics that can be relied upon to identify whether a company is economically dependent on another company. The present paper aims to fill this gap, and argues that bargaining theory and the economics of relative market power can be helpful to characterise economic dependence. We summarise a number of takeaways from this literature, and describe empirical strategies that can be relied upon to try and quantify economic dependence in specific cases.
ISSN (Print)
1866–3494
Journal Article
Research in the Sociology of Organizations 76: 129–158
2021 AOM Best Paper Award Best Paper Proceedings
Chengwei Liu, Chia-Jung Tsay (2021)
Subject(s)
Diversity and inclusion; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Chance models, adaptation, organizational learning, luck, situation, risk-taking
Chance models—mechanisms that explain empirical regularities through unsystematic variance—have a long tradition in the sciences but have been historically marginalized in management scholarship, relative to an agentic worldview about the role of managers and organizations. An exception is the work of James G. March and his coauthors, who proposed a variety of chance models that explain important management phenomena, including the careers of top executives, managerial risk taking, and organizational anarchy, learning, and adaptation. This paper serves as a tribute to the beauty of these “little ideas” and demonstrates how they can be recombined to generate novel implications. In particular, we focus on the example of an inverted V-shaped performance association centering around the year when executives were featured in a prominent listing, Barron’s annual list of Top 30 chief executive officers. Our extension of March and Shapira’s 1992 model provides a novel explanation for why many of the executives’ exceptional performances did not persist. In contrast to the common accounts of complacency, hubris, and statistical regression, the results show that declines from high performance may result from the way luck interacts with these executives’ slow adaptation, incompetence, and self-reinforced risk taking. We conclude by elaborating on the normative implications of chance models, which address many current management and societal challenges. We further encourage the continued development of chance models to help explain performance differences, shifting from accounts that favor heroic stories of corporate leaders toward accounts that favor their changing fortunes.
Copyright © 2021 Emerald Publishing Limited
Volume
76
Journal Pages
129–158
ISSN (Online)
978-1-78756-591-3
ISSN (Print)
978-1-78756-592-0
Journal Article
Organization Science 32 (5): 1193–1209
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
behavioral strategy, diversity, behavioral failures, strategic opportunities, CSRL limits to arbitrage
The persistent failure of organizations to engage diversity—to employ a diverse workforce and fully realize its potential—is puzzling, as it creates labor-market inefficiencies and untapped opportunities. Addressing this puzzle from a behavioral strategy as arbitrage perspective, this paper argues that attractive opportunities tend to be protected by strong behavioral and social limits to arbitrage. I outline four limits—cognizing, searching, reconfiguring, and legitimizing (CSRL)—that deter firms from sensing, seizing, integrating and justifying valuable diversity. The case of Moneyball is used to illustrate how these CSRL limits prevented mispriced human resources from being arbitraged away sooner, with implications for engaging cognitive diversity that go beyond sports. This perspective describes why behavioral failures as arbitrage opportunities can persist and prescribes strategists, as contrarian theorists, a framework for formulating relevant behavioral and social problems to solve in order to search for and exploit these untapped opportunities.
Copyright © 2021, The Author
Volume
32
Journal Pages
1193–1209
Journal Article
Career Development International 26 (4): 582–595
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
Career shocks, executives, executive coaching
This paper is a qualitative exploration of managers’ career shock experiences reflected in executive coaching interventions. It takes an anecdotal look at how executives react to shocks of various valences, and how coaching attempts to assist them by processing their first reactions and choosing a response. The paper particularly looks at managers’ responses almost immediately following a shocking event triggering their request for coaching help.
Volume
26
Journal Pages
582–595