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Subject(s)
Information technology and systems
Keyword(s)
Sovereignty, cyberspace, cyber operations, Tallinn Manual, cyber sovereignty, digital sovereignty, defend forward, persistent engagement
The article critically examines the current discourse on the legal status and substance of “sovereignty” in the context of the application of international law to cyberspace against the backdrop of conflicting political-ideological attitudes. After tracing the origins of the interpretation of “respect for sovereignty” as a primary rule of international law, two approaches to cyberspace are surveyed that challenge the emerging consensus: “cyber imperialism,” embodied by the US and the other Five Eyes members on the one hand, and “cyber Westphalia,” represented by China, Russia, and Iran on the other. Both conceive cyberspace in ways fundamentally irreconcilable with prevailing legal views. A third group of states endorses the “sovereignty-as-rule” understanding but leaves this legal position vulnerable to both authoritarian co-optation and imperialist dismissal. In light of this, the paper offers an alternative interpretation of state practice and international jurisprudence that constructs sovereignty as a principle with derivative primary rules. It is shown that despite not by itself having the status of a rule, the principle of sovereignty allows for the identification of rules that protect the territorial integrity and political independence of states beyond the traditional notions of the prohibition of intervention and the use of force. Following a careful analysis of evidence in existing practice in support of this novel, doctrinally more precise understanding of sovereignty, the policies of “persistent engagement” and “cyber sovereignty” are assessed in light of the argument’s legal implications.
ISSN (Online)
2328-9708
ISSN (Print)
1053-6736
Journal Article
Organizational Research Methods
Eric Quintane, Martin Wood, John Dunn, Lucia Falzon
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Brokering process, behavioral measure, relational events sequences, network algebra
Extant research in organizational networks has provided critical insights into understanding the benefits of occupying a brokerage position. More recently, researchers have moved beyond the brokerage position to consider the brokering processes (arbitration and collaboration) brokers engage in and their implications for performance. However, brokering processes are typically measured using scales that reflect individuals’ orientation toward engaging in a behavior, rather than the behavior itself. In this article, we propose a measure that captures the behavioral process of brokering. The measure indicates the extent to which actors engage in arbitration versus collaboration based on sequences of time stamped relational events, such as emails, message boards, and recordings of meetings. We demonstrate the validity of our measure as well as its predictive ability. By leveraging the temporal information inherent in sequences of relational events, our behavioral measure of brokering creates opportunities for researchers to explore the dynamics of brokerage and their impact on individuals, and also paves the way for a systematic examination of the temporal dynamics of networks.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
ESMT Case Study
ESMT Case Study No. ESMT-421-0191-1
Bianca Schmitz, Ulf Schäfer
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
Culture, organizational culture, organizational structure and design, leadership styles
At the end of 2008, the founder and employees of MEG - an insurance brokerage firm active in the market since 2003 - were looking forward to a promising future. Having achieved sales of €33 million in 2007 and just short of €54 million in 2008, the company was aiming to hit the €100 million mark in the next financial year. Within a very short time, the firm founded by Mehmet E. Göker as “insurance specialists” had established itself as the second-most successful insurance broker in Germany. Its rapid rise to the top was thanks to a business model that consistently identified and supported customers interested in insurance products - and also thanks to a particular corporate culture at MEG.
Key teaching/learning objectives:
- Introduction to corporate culture
- What is a corporate culture?
- How to establish and change corporate culture?

Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Cybersecurity, governance, Brexit, EU-UK relations, European Union, United Kingdom


The book chapter analyzes the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement's (TCA) Chapter on future thematic cooperation on cybersecurity. It explains the broader political, technological and regulatory context of cybersecurity cooperation at the international and the EU levels. It then analyzes the TCA's passages individually and within this broader context. Finally, it provides an evaluation and outlook on future EU-UK cooperation on cybersecurity.
Secondary Title
Handels- und Kooperationsvertrag EU/GB
ISBN
978-3-8487-7188-2
Keyword(s)
hedge funds, cash flows, hot hand fallacy, performance streaks, relative weights, smart money
Cash flows to hedge funds are highly sensitive to performance streaks, a streak being defined as subsequent quarters during which a fund performs above or below a benchmark, even after controlling for a wide range of common performance measures. At the same time, streaks have limited predictive power regarding future fund performance. This suggests investors weigh information suboptimally, and their decisions are driven too strongly by a belief in continuation of good performance, consistent with the “hot hand fallacy.” The hedge funds that investors choose to invest in do not perform significantly better than those they divest from. These findings are consistent with overreaction to certain types of information and do not support the notion that sophisticated investors have superior information or superior information processing abilities.
© 2021, INFORMS
Journal Article
Operations Research
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Peng Sun
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Sequential decision making, time pressure, information search, Bayesian inference
Arrow et al. (1949) introduced the first sequential search problem, “where at each stage the options available are to stop and take a definite action or to continue sampling for more information." We study how time pressure in the form of task accumulation may affect this decision problem. To that end, we consider a search problem where the decision maker (DM) faces a stream of random decision tasks to be treated one at a time, and accumulate when not attended to. We formulate the problem of managing this form of pressure as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, and characterize the corresponding optimal policy. We find that the DM needs to alleviate this pressure very differently depending on how the search on the current task has unfolded thus far. As the search progresses, the DM is less and less willing to sustain high levels of workloads in the beginning and end of the search, but actually increases the maximum workload she is willing to handle in the middle of the process. The DM manages this workload by first making a priori decisions to release some accumulated tasks, and later by aborting the current search and deciding based on her updated belief. This novel search strategy critically depends on the DM's prior belief about the tasks, and stems, in part, from an effect related to the decision ambivalence. These findings are robust to various extensions of our basic set-up.
© 2019, INFORMS
Journal Article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (2): 1019–1054
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Sophistication, naivete, first-degree, price, discrimination, third-degree price discrimination, big data, privacy
JEL Code(s)
D21, D49, D69, L19
We initiate the study of naivete-based discrimination, the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers’ naivete. Knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm's willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer's mistakes, so naivete-based discrimination is not Pareto-improving, can be Pareto-damaging, and often lowers total welfare when classical preference-based discrimination does not. Moreover, the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature: the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers. If the distortion is homogenous across naive and sophisticated consumers, then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition, naivete-based discrimination lowers total welfare. In contrast, if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers, then perfect naivete-based discrimination maximizes social welfare, although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare. And if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers, then naivete-based discrimination has no effect on welfare. We identify applications for each of these cases. In our primary example, a credit market with present-biased borrowers, firms lend more than socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay, creating a homogenous distortion. The condition for naivete-based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence.
This is an open access article.
Volume
132
Journal Pages
1019–1054
Journal Article
Review of Economic Studies 84 (1): 323–356
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi, Takeshi Murooka
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
JEL Code(s)
D14, D18, D21
We analyze conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that “bad" products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than “good" products. Specifically, (1) in a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms, a deceptive equilibrium - in which firms hide additional prices - does not exist and firms make zero profits. But perversely, (2) if the product is socially wasteful, then a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, (3) in a market with multiple products, since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison, it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers. We apply our framework to the mutual-fund and credit-card markets, arguing that it explains a number of empirical findings regarding these industries.
This is an open access article.
Volume
84
Journal Pages
323–356
ESMT Working Paper
ESMT Working Paper No. 22-03
David Ronayne, Roberto Veneziani, William R. Zame (2022)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
subjective probability, choice under uncertainty, online experiments
JEL Code(s)
D01, D81, D84, C09
Anscombe & Aumann (1963) offer a definition of subjective probability in terms of comparisons with objective probabilities. That definition - which has provided the basis for much of the succeeding work on subjective probability - presumes that the subjective probability of an event is independent of the prize consequences of that event, a property we term Prize Independence. We design experiments to test Prize Independence and find that a large fraction of our subjects violate it; thus, they do not have subjective probabilities. These findings raise questions about the empirical relevance of much of the literature on subjective probability.
Pages
49
ISSN (Print)
1866–3494
Journal Article
Frontiers in Psychology 13
Anke Dassler, Evgenia Lysova, Svetlana Khapova, Konstantin Korotov (2022)
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
Employer attractiveness, organizational commitment, current employees, existing employees, employer brand
JEL Code(s)
M12
With the growing interest in employer attractiveness, research is unsystematic on how this phenomenon can be conceptualized and studied. Studies tend to make little conceptual differentiation regarding for whom employers should be attractive, and therefore, address the perspectives of potential as well as current employees, who work in organizations for long periods of time. In this study our arguments relate to the phenomenon’s conceptual clarity as well as its differentiation from other related concepts. By focusing on employer attractiveness for current employees, we have systematically reviewed 48 studies published in business and management journals, and categorized findings into the Inputs-Mediators-Outputs model. This approach allowed us to depict significant limitations in the existing knowledge about employer attractiveness from the current employees’ perspective, and offer avenues for future research. Next, to delineate the future research agenda, we have concluded this study with a discussion on what our findings mean for managers and organizations.
Volume
13