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Journal Article
Industry and Innovation
Henry Sauermann, Susanne Beck, Carsten Bergenholtz, Marcel Bogers, Tiare-Maria Brasseur, Marie Louise Conradsen, Diletta Di Marco et al.
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Open innovation in Science, openness, collaboration in science, Open Science, interdisciplinary research
Openness and collaboration in scientific research are attracting increasing attention from scholars and practitioners alike. However, a common understanding of these phenomena is hindered by disciplinary boundaries and disconnected research streams. We link dispersed knowledge on Open Innovation, Open Science, and related concepts such as Responsible Research and Innovation by proposing a unifying Open Innovation in Science (OIS) Research Framework. This framework captures the antecedents, contingencies, and consequences of open and collaborative practices along the entire process of generating and disseminating scientific insights and translating them into innovation. Moreover, it elucidates individual-, team-, organisation-, field-, and society‐level factors shaping OIS practices. To conceptualise the framework, we employed a collaborative approach involving 47 scholars from multiple disciplines, highlighting both tensions and commonalities between existing approaches. The OIS Research Framework thus serves as a basis for future research, informs policy discussions, and provides guidance to scientists and practitioners.
Journal Article
Review of Economics and Statistics
Fabian Gaessler, Stefan Wagner
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
patents, drugs, data exclusivity, clinical trials
JEL Code(s)
K41, L24, L65, O31, O32, O34
Journal Article
Operations Research
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Peng Sun
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Sequential decision making, time pressure, information search, Bayesian inference
Arrow et al. (1949) introduced the first sequential search problem, “where at each stage the options available are to stop and take a definite action or to continue sampling for more information." We study how time pressure in the form of task accumulation may affect this decision problem. To that end, we consider a search problem where the decision maker (DM) faces a stream of random decision tasks to be treated one at a time, and accumulate when not attended to. We formulate the problem of managing this form of pressure as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, and characterize the corresponding optimal policy. We find that the DM needs to alleviate this pressure very differently depending on how the search on the current task has unfolded thus far. As the search progresses, the DM is less and less willing to sustain high levels of workloads in the beginning and end of the search, but actually increases the maximum workload she is willing to handle in the middle of the process. The DM manages this workload by first making a priori decisions to release some accumulated tasks, and later by aborting the current search and deciding based on her updated belief. This novel search strategy critically depends on the DM's prior belief about the tasks, and stems, in part, from an effect related to the decision ambivalence. These findings are robust to various extensions of our basic set-up.
© 2019, INFORMS
Book Chapter
In The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security, edited by Paul Cornish, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Secondary Title
The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security
ISBN
9780198800682
Journal Article
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (2): 1019–1054
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Sophistication, naivete, first-degree, price, discrimination, third-degree price discrimination, big data, privacy
JEL Code(s)
D21, D49, D69, L19
We initiate the study of naivete-based discrimination, the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers’ naivete. Knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm's willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer's mistakes, so naivete-based discrimination is not Pareto-improving, can be Pareto-damaging, and often lowers total welfare when classical preference-based discrimination does not. Moreover, the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature: the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers. If the distortion is homogenous across naive and sophisticated consumers, then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition, naivete-based discrimination lowers total welfare. In contrast, if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers, then perfect naivete-based discrimination maximizes social welfare, although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare. And if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers, then naivete-based discrimination has no effect on welfare. We identify applications for each of these cases. In our primary example, a credit market with present-biased borrowers, firms lend more than socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay, creating a homogenous distortion. The condition for naivete-based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence.
This is an open access article.
Volume
132
Journal Pages
1019–1054
Journal Article
Review of Economic Studies 84 (1): 323–356
Paul Heidhues, Botond Kőszegi, Takeshi Murooka
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
JEL Code(s)
D14, D18, D21
We analyze conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that “bad" products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than “good" products. Specifically, (1) in a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms, a deceptive equilibrium - in which firms hide additional prices - does not exist and firms make zero profits. But perversely, (2) if the product is socially wasteful, then a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, (3) in a market with multiple products, since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison, it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers. We apply our framework to the mutual-fund and credit-card markets, arguing that it explains a number of empirical findings regarding these industries.
This is an open access article.
Volume
84
Journal Pages
323–356
Journal Article
Research in the Sociology of Organizations 77: 111–136
Matthew S. Bothner, Frederic C. Godart, Noah Askin, Wonjae Lee (2022)
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Sociology, status, cognate concepts
Status constitutes a core research concept across the social sciences. However, its definition is still contested, and questions persist about its consequences. We begin with a flexible, provisional definition: status is a relational asset possessed by social actors insofar as they are highly regarded by highly-regarded others. Using this definition as a backdrop, we develop a fourfold typology based on how status is used as an asset and from where it is derived. The typology allows us to explore the implications of considering status as either a quality-signal or a good, and of viewing status-conferring ties as either deference-based or dominance-based. We then consider the implications of our framework for the generation of novelty. Although status has been connected to many social and economic outcomes, because of competing predictions in the literature—the generation of novelty has been linked to all regions of the status distribution—we sketch intuitions for future research on the status-novelty linkage. We also work toward greater conceptual clarity by comparing and contrasting status with selected related concepts: quality, reputation, and legitimacy. We conclude with considerations of future research, including cautionary remarks regarding network-analytic measurement in light of the definition we propose.
Copyright © 2022 Matthew S. Bothner, Frédéric Godart, Noah Askin and Wonjae Lee
Volume
77
Journal Pages
111–136
ISSN (Online)
978-1-78756-591-3
ISSN (Print)
978-1-78756-592-0
Journal Article
Organization Studies 43 (1): 35–57
Francois Collet, Gianluca Carnabuci, Gorkhan Ertug, Tengjian Zou (2022)
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Congress, ideology, influence, social capital, status
Prior research assumes that high-status actors have greater organizational influence than lower-status ones, that is, it is easier for the former to get their ideas and initiatives adopted by the organization than it is for the latter. Drawing from the literature on ideology, we posit that the status–influence link is contingent on actors’ ideological position. Specifically, status confers organizational influence to the degree that the focal actor is ideologically mainstream. The more an actor’s ideology deviates from the mainstream the less will her status translate into increased organizational influence. We find support for this hypothesis using data on the work of legislators in the House of Representatives in the United States Congress. By illuminating how and under what conditions status leads to increased influence, this study qualifies and extends current understandings of the role of status in organizations.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
Volume
43
Journal Pages
35–57
Journal Article
Journal of Management 48 (1): 49–76
Martin Schweinsberg, Stefan Thau, Madan M. Pillutla (2022)
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
impasses, negotiations, agreements, conflict resolution, bargaining
Although impasses are frequently experienced by negotiators, are featured in newspaper articles, and are reflected in online searches, and can be costly, negotiation scholarship does not appear to consider them seriously as phenomenon worth explaining. A review of negotiation tasks to study impasses reveals that they bias negotiators towards agreement. We systematically organize past findings on impasses and integrate them in the impasse type, cause, and resolution model (ITCR model). Our fundamental assumption is that a positive bargaining zone does not imply symmetric preferences for an agreement. One or both negotiators may prefer an impasse over an agreement despite a positive bargaining zone. We argue that it is beneficial for management research to distinguish between three impasse types: if both negotiators perceive benefit from an impasse, they are wanted; if one negotiator perceives benefits from an impasse, they are forced; and if both do not perceive benefits from the impasse, they are unwanted. We review structural (e.g., bargaining zone, communication channels), interpersonal (e.g., tough tactics, emotions) and intrapersonal (e.g., biases, available information, and framing) factors as the likely antecedents of the three impasse types. We also examine evidence which suggests that wanted impasses can be resolved by changing the negotiation structure for both parties, forced impasses can be resolved through persuasion, and unwanted impasses can be overcome by debiasing both parties. Finally, we review current methodological guidance and provide updated recommendations on how scholars should deal with impasses in both study designs and data analyses.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
Volume
48
Journal Pages
49–76
Journal Article
MIT Sloan Management Review 63 (2)
Thorsten Grohsjean, Linus Dahlander, Ammon Salter (2021)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Innovation strategy
Organizations can make better choices about which R&D projects gain funding by managing bias and involving more people.
Volume
63