Publication records

The case study describes developments at Heraeus, a successful mid-size company from Germany that markets a wide range of high-grade precious metal products worldwide. It presents the developments of the segment that is active on the market for silver pastes for photovoltaic systems. This market had experienced strong shifts in demand since 2011 – firstly from Europe and North America to Asia, particularly China, and secondly from standard products to customized product solutions. Due to these developments Heraeus had lost its market leadership and recruited Andreas Liebheit as the new head of the segment, who was to get it back on a successful track. The participants will discuss what strategic decisions Andreas Liebheit should make to counter the market developments and what implications these decisions will have in particular on marketing and sales, the global organization structure and leadership culture of the segment. Beyond the strategic aspect, the case can serve to explore what conclusions Heraeus should draw on a company-wide level from the developments of the segment.

• Analyzing situation and trends on a technology-driven, global B2B market.
• Understanding challenges and opportunities of small/medium companies (‘hidden champions’) when competing with big corporations in niche markets.
• Reflecting options of changing business strategy and reviewing their implications, in particular regarding:
• the global distribution of the internal value chain of a company
• leadership culture when shifting the business focus from the western hemisphere to Asia
• HR requirements when moving from product to solution business

NOTE: This case does not have a teaching note and is not available via our distributors. If you are interested in this case, please contact either the author or publications@esmt.org.

This case considers the CEO of a logistic company trying to form her own opinion about whether global warming is a real concern or simply a hoax. The case consists of two contradictory reports reviewing the existing evidences for global warming, from two scientific experts holding opposite views on the subject. The case addresses one of the most fundamental problems of knowledge: How can organizations and leaders understand what cannot be fully observed? The issue is at the heart of managing long-term changes and possible sustainability risks faced by organizations. Changes or risks such as these are difficult to recognize, because they typically emerge from complex systems that are not fully observable. The global warming debate provides a perfect illustration of this issue. The teaching objectives of this case are to explore different approaches to infer changes and sustainability risks such as these, and to determine the role of data and analytics in these processes. In doing so, participants also learn about the main evidence for global warming.

The case has been used in both executive and MBA classes.

This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touch upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan “[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds” was labeled “tasteless”. IKEA had to stop the campaign because it “couldn’t prove” the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA’s creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan “[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds” was labeled “tasteless”. IKEA had to stop the campaign because it “couldn’t prove” the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA’s creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan “[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds” was labeled “tasteless”. IKEA had to stop the campaign because it “couldn’t prove” the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA’s creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan “[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds” was labeled “tasteless”. IKEA had to stop the campaign because it “couldn’t prove” the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA’s creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.

The case provides an example of an individual who meets harsh criticism, personal attacks, and broad resistance despite clear evidence that what he is proposing is right and could save the lives of thousands of human beings. The case recounts the story of Dr. Ignaz Philip Semmelweis, a pioneer in medical antiseptic procedures who is today known as “the savior of mothers.” In 1847, Semmelweis discovered that the practice of hand disinfection in obstetrical clinics can effectively eliminate the outbreak of puerperal fever (“childbed fever”), a condition that killed up to 30 percent of mothers and babies in maternity clinics at the time of the case. The relatively short case – which is designed to be handed out during class – is divided into three parts. Part A describes the situation at Vienna General Hospital in 1846, when Semmelweis is assigned to head one of the two maternity clinics. Much of this part is dedicated to describing the natural experiment that Semmelweis encountered when learning that the two clinics had vastly different mortality rates. Part B lists the many hypotheses that Semmelweis had formulated and refuted, reports on his discovery that the contamination of women by doctors performing anatomical dissections of corpses is causing puerperal fever, and reveals his findings that it can be easily and effectively treated through hand disinfection. Part C provides an account of the resistance he faced from the medical establishment, despite the overwhelming evidence that Semmelweis had collected in support of his findings.

The case has the potential to be an eye-opening experience, as it describes a situation in which the protagonist of change is unable to convince the relevant community, despite having clear evidence: Semmelweis can prove that he is right, but instead of receiving recognition and gratitude and having his recommendations adopted, he meets resistance, personal attack, and ridicule. This is an important lesson for students, who often believe that change can effectively be brought to groups, organizations, and societies when there is clear evidence that proves the integrity of a new proposition.

In 2002 the management team of Deutsche Lufthansa AG was considering the upcoming threat from low-cost airlines in the context of an increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment. Finally the decision was taken to respond to the innovation by opening an own low-cost carrier, Germanwings in late 2002. But over time the business model of Germanwings was modified repeatedly. The case series covers * Lufthansa’s considerations regarding various options to respond to the competitive challenges brought up by the emerging low-cost airlines such as easyJet or Ryanair in 2002 (Case A), * the foundation of Germanwings in late 2002 and some early successes until 2005 (Case B), and * some more recent changes in the Germanwings business model in the following five years until end of 2010 (Case C).

The purpose of the Germanwings case series is to develop a better understanding of possible responses to disruptive business models. It relies on the example of Lufthansa who for many years was considered to have mastered the ability to manage two alternative business models, the full-service model of the mother company and the low-cost model through its subsidiary Germanwings that was launched in 2002. The following three learning objectives are addressed in particular: 1. How can an incumbent player address the challenge of business model disruptive innovation? 2. How to structure the relationship between the two businesses exploiting the different models? 3. How can a company manage two radically different business models?

In 2002 the management team of Deutsche Lufthansa AG was considering the upcoming threat from low-cost airlines in the context of an increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment. Finally the decision was taken to respond to the innovation by opening an own low-cost carrier, Germanwings in late 2002. But over time the business model of Germanwings was modified repeatedly. The case series covers * Lufthansa’s considerations regarding various options to respond to the competitive challenges brought up by the emerging low-cost airlines such as easyJet or Ryanair in 2002 (Case A), * the foundation of Germanwings in late 2002 and some early successes until 2005 (Case B), and * some more recent changes in the Germanwings business model in the following five years until end of 2010 (Case C).

The purpose of the Germanwings case series is to develop a better understanding of possible responses to disruptive business models. It relies on the example of Lufthansa who for many years was considered to have mastered the ability to manage two alternative business models, the full-service model of the mother company and the low-cost model through its subsidiary Germanwings that was launched in 2002. The following three learning objectives are addressed in particular: 1. How can an incumbent player address the challenge of business model disruptive innovation? 2. How to structure the relationship between the two businesses exploiting the different models? 3. How can a company manage two radically different business models?

In 2002 the management team of Deutsche Lufthansa AG was considering the upcoming threat from low-cost airlines in the context of an increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment. Finally the decision was taken to respond to the innovation by opening an own low-cost carrier, Germanwings in late 2002. But over time the business model of Germanwings was modified repeatedly. The case series covers * Lufthansa’s considerations regarding various options to respond to the competitive challenges brought up by the emerging low-cost airlines such as easyJet or Ryanair in 2002 (Case A), * the foundation of Germanwings in late 2002 and some early successes until 2005 (Case B), and * some more recent changes in the Germanwings business model in the following five years until end of 2010 (Case C).

The purpose of the Germanwings case series is to develop a better understanding of possible responses to disruptive business models. It relies on the example of Lufthansa who for many years was considered to have mastered the ability to manage two alternative business models, the full-service model of the mother company and the low-cost model through its subsidiary Germanwings that was launched in 2002. The following three learning objectives are addressed in particular: 1. How can an incumbent player address the challenge of business model disruptive innovation? 2. How to structure the relationship between the two businesses exploiting the different models? 3. How can a company manage two radically different business models?