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Journal Article
Review of Finance
Tobias Berg, Manju Puri, Jörg Rocholl
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
Loan officer incentives, internal ratings, hard information, Lucas critique
JEL Code(s)
G21
Banks have been subject to a wave of investigations regarding fraudulent behavior. Much of the discussion centers on manipulation of hard information by employees down the line, who missell mortgages due to flawed debt-to-income ratios or manipulate LIBOR and FX rates. Despite these prominent cases, little is known in the academic literature as to whether and how manipulation of hard information is affected by incentives of these employees, and if anything there is increasing reliance on quantitative, hard information based models for regulating banks. In this paper, we fill this gap by analyzing almost a quarter million of retail loan applications. We show that loan officer incentives significantly skew ratings even in settings where ratings are computed using hard information only. These incentives have a first-order effect on bank profitability. Our results suggest that ratings are subject to the Lucas critique: Incentives influence the hard information reported by loan officers and thus change the link between hard information and default.
Journal Article
Management Science
2018 POMS HOCM Best Paper Award
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Shouqiang Wang
Subject(s)
Health and environment; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Information design, bayesian persuasion game, dynamic programming, statistical decision, global health, disaster management
The World Health Organization seeks effective ways to alert its member states about global pandemics. Motivated by this challenge, we study a public agency’s problem of designing warning policies to mitigate potential disasters that occur with advance notice. The agency privately receives early information about recurring harmful events and issues warnings to induce an uninformed stakeholder to take preemptive actions. The agency’s decision to issue a warning critically depends on its reputation, which we define as the stake- holder’s belief regarding the accuracy of the agency’s information. The agency faces then a trade-off between eliciting a proper response today and maintaining its reputation in order to elicit responses to future events. We formulate this problem as a dynamic Bayesian persuasion game, which we solve in closed form. We find that the agency sometimes strategically misrepresents its advance information about a current threat in order to cultivate its future reputation. When its reputation is sufficiently low, the agency downplays the risk and actually downplays more as its reputation improves. By contrast, when its reputation is high, the agency sometimes exaggerates the threat and exaggerates more as its reputation deteriorates. Only when its reputation is moderate does the agency send warning messages that fully disclose its private information. Our study suggests a plausible and novel rationale for some of the false alarms or omissions observed in practice. We further test the robustness of our findings to imperfect advance information, disasters without advance notice, and heterogeneous receivers.
Copyright © 2019, INFORMS
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Pre-entry experience, mobile telecommunications, consumer segments, complementary assets, core technical knowledge
JEL Code(s)
C51, L10, O33
We study how two distinct types of pre-entry experience – core technological experience and market-based complementary experience – affect post-entry performance in a new industry. We focus on the fit between capabilities generated through pre-entry experience and the preferences of heterogeneous consumer segments. Specifically, we suggest that firms with pre-entry experience in the focal technology will attract more valuable consumers, but as these consumers typically make adoption decisions early the firm must enter early to benefit. Conversely, firms with pre-entry experience in the focal market will attract a larger share of less valuable consumers regardless of entry timing. Our empirical analysis of the global 2G mobile telecommunications industry supports our theory and provides important insights for research on experience and entry dynamics in high-technology industries.
© 2019, INFORMS
Journal Article
Operations Research
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Peng Sun
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Sequential decision making, time pressure, information search, Bayesian inference
Arrow et al. (1949) introduced the first sequential search problem, “where at each stage the options available are to stop and take a definite action or to continue sampling for more information." We study how time pressure in the form of task accumulation may affect this decision problem. To that end, we consider a search problem where the decision maker (DM) faces a stream of random decision tasks to be treated one at a time, and accumulate when not attended to. We formulate the problem of managing this form of pressure as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, and characterize the corresponding optimal policy. We find that the DM needs to alleviate this pressure very differently depending on how the search on the current task has unfolded thus far. As the search progresses, the DM is less and less willing to sustain high levels of workloads in the beginning and end of the search, but actually increases the maximum workload she is willing to handle in the middle of the process. The DM manages this workload by first making a priori decisions to release some accumulated tasks, and later by aborting the current search and deciding based on her updated belief. This novel search strategy critically depends on the DM's prior belief about the tasks, and stems, in part, from an effect related to the decision ambivalence. These findings are robust to various extensions of our basic set-up.
© 2019, INFORMS
Subject(s)
Entrepreneurship; Finance, accounting and corporate governance; Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Family business, rational choice, equity, need for control
Prior research has argued that family firms are reluctant to consider external equity as a source of financing because they fear a loss of control, which would limit their socioemotional wealth. However, prior empirical research has neglected potential contingencies that determine whether family firms’ need for control affects their equity financing decisions. The purpose of this paper is to provide first insight into this research void. The paper builds on rational choice theory and a logit regression using secondary data. The study shows that the effect of family firm owners’ need for control on their consideration of external equity depends on the extent to which owners expect investors to interfere with management and the extent to which decision making is affected by emotions. Hereby, the present study provides evidence that family firm owners’ decisions to use external equity are more complex than previously presumed. This study has several limitations that provide fruitful avenues for further research. Overall, the authors list and detail seven different limitations in the paper, e.g. the narrow focus on equity financing, the use of a partial model, the fact that the authors did not conceptualize differences between different types of investors (such as high net worth individuals, private equity firms and venture capital firms) in the model and further more. The study shows that investors need to understand the complex interplay among family firms’ need for control, expected investor interference and emotional decision making, to correctly assess their chances of success when approaching family firms for equity. Prior empirical research has neglected potential contingencies that determine whether family firms’ need for control affects their equity financing decisions. The present paper provides first insight into this research void.
With permission of Emerald
Journal Article
Journal of Financial Economics
Benjamin Grosse Rueschkamp, Sascha Steffen, Daniel Streitz
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
Debt capital structure, bond debt, unconventional monetary policy, CSPP, real effects
JEL Code(s)
G01, G21, G28
We study the transmission channels from central banks’ quantitative easing programs via the banking sector when central banks start purchasing corporate bonds. We find evidence consistent with a “capital structure channel” of monetary policy. The announcement of central bank purchases reduces the bond yields of firms whose bonds are eligible for central bank purchases. These firms substitute bank term loans with bond debt, thereby relaxing banks’ lending constraints: banks with low Tier-1 ratios and high non-performing loans increase lending to private (and profitable) firms, which experience a growth in capital expenditures and sales. The credit reallocation increases banks’ risk-taking in corporate credit.
With permission of Elsevier
Journal Article
Review of Economics and Statistics
Steffen Altmann, Armin Falk, Paul Heidhues, Rajshri Jayaraman, Marrit Teirlinck
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Default options, online platforms, charitable giving, field experiment
JEL Code(s)
D03, D01, D64, C93
We study how defaults affect charitable donations. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large online platform for charitable giving, we exogenously vary the default options in the donation form in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to the primary donation decision, namely, how much to contribute to the charitable cause. The second relates to a “codonation” decision of how much to contribute to supporting the online platform itself. We find a strong impact of defaults on individual behavior: in each of our treatments, the modal positive contributions in both choice dimensions invariably correspond to the specified default amounts. Defaults, nevertheless, have no significant effects on average donation levels. This is because defaults in the donation domain induce some people to donate more and others to donate less. In contrast, higher defaults in the secondary choice dimension unambiguously induce higher average contributions to the online platform. We complement our experimental results by setting up and estimating a structural model that explores whether personalizing defaults based on individuals’ donation histories can help the online platform to increase donation revenues.
Accepted at Review of Economics and Statistics
Journal Article
International Journal of Technology Management
Francis Bidault, Alessio Castello
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Co-development, R&D partnerships, cooperative R&D, joint R&D, technology alliances, joint innovation, co-innovation, relational quality, confidence in partners, trust and control
Co-development alliances are a specific form of cooperative arrangements which firms engage in with the intention of creating new products, services or technologies through coordinated efforts and commitment with other organisations. These cooperative agreements have been increasing in numbers over the past few decades. In this article, we discuss the role of relational quality, a construct that has been recognised as affecting the survival and ultimate success of alliances. We argue that relational quality is especially critical in co-development alliances, and propose a model for analysing it, and its drivers, based on a set of retrospective and longitudinal case studies that we conducted. We formulate several research propositions that can be derived from the model presented.
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Capacity investment, optimal contracts, capital diversion, financial constraints, newsvendor model, moral hazard
We study a firm's capacity choice under demand uncertainty given it must finance this investment externally. Sharing profits with investors causes governance problems affecting both capacity and demand: the firm may “steal" capital, which reduces effective capacity, and \shirk" on market-development, which reduces demand. We adopt an optimal contracting approach whereby the firm optimizes among feasible financial claims derived endogenously. We characterize its optimal financing and capacity choices. First, debt financing is optimal: it minimizes the incentives to both divert and shirk. Second, the firm underinvests (overinvests) if the effort problem is mild (severe) enough relative to the diversion problem. Thus, a worsening of the same governance problem can lead to over- or underinvestment depending on circumstances. Third, we find that the diversion and shirking problems interact in their impact on capacity investment. In particular, if the shirking problem is mild enough, the more severe the diversion problem, the less the firm invests. However, if the shirking problem is severe enough, the effect of diversion is reversed: the more severe the diversion problem, the more the firm invests.
Copyright © 2018, INFORMS
Journal Article
Journal of Management
Vivek Tandon, Gokhan Ertug, Gianluca Carnabuci
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Learning-by-hiring, inter-firm mobility, innovation, patents
Research has shown that hiring R&D scientists from competitors fosters organizational learning. We examine whether hiring scientists who have many collaborative ties with the hiring firm prior to the mobility event produces different learning outcomes than hiring scientists who have few or no such ties. We theorize that prior ties reduce explorative learning and increase exploitative learning. From our arguments we also derive other testable implications. Namely, we posit that prior ties lead the hiring firm to focus on that part of a new hire’s knowledge with which they are already familiar and that they help appropriate the new hire’s newly generated knowledge. At the same time, prior ties induce new hires to search locally within the hiring firm’s knowledge base and also to produce more incremental, lower-impact innovations. Using data on R&D scientists’ mobility in the Electronics and Electrical Goods industry, we find broad support for our hypotheses. Our results extend our theoretical understanding of learning-by-hiring processes and bear practical managerial implications.
With permission of SAGE Publishing