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Publication records
Journal Article
Review of Economics and Statistics
Fabian Gaessler, Stefan Wagner
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
patents, drugs, data exclusivity, clinical trials
JEL Code(s)
K41, L24, L65, O31, O32, O34
Journal Article
Organization Science
Paola Criscuolo, Linus Dahlander, Thorsten Grohsjean, Ammon Salter
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Selection, novelty, decision-making, innovation, panel
This paper examines how groups fall prey to the sequence effect in decision-making about R&D projects. We propose that the temporal sequence of selection matters in R&D—even when it should be completely irrelevant—because projects that appear in a sequence following a funded project are themselves less likely to receive funding. Building on the idea that individuals are more likely to suffer from such bias when attention is limited, we develop new theory examining three group-level moderators that may influence attention among panel members and thereby strengthen or weaken the sequence effect, namely the timing of panel meeting, the workload of the person introducing the project to the panel, and the differences in expertise between the panel members and the introducer. We test these conjectures using a randomization in sequence order from several rounds of R&D project selection at a leading professional service firm. We find robust support for the existence of sequencing effects in R&D as well as moderating effects. These findings have broader implications for the selection of innovation ideas and R&D management as they suggest that a previously overlooked dimension affects selection outcomes.
© 2020, INFORMS
Journal Article
Review of Accounting Studies
Frank Ecker, Jennifer Francis, Per Olsson, Katherine Schipper
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
Association tests, non-random sampling, equity, returns
Journal Article
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance
Neil Bhattacharya, Per Olsson, Hyungshin Park
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
Analyst forecast, earnings announcement, investor sophistication, under-reaction
We decompose analysts’ earnings forecast error into predictable and unpredictable components, and investigate individual vis-à-vis institutional investors’ reactions to each of these components. We find that in the immediate post-earnings announcement window, only individuals under-react to the predictable component, while both individuals and institutions under-react to the unpredictable component. The price drift in this window is driven primarily by investors’ under-reaction to the unpredictable component. This drift remains highly significant in larger firms and intensifies in firms with complex financial reports, suggesting that it likely represents the slow and noisy process of price discovery. Around the next quarterly earnings announcement, only individuals under-react to the previous quarter’s predictable component, and this fixation drives the entire price drift in this window. This drift disappears in larger firms, and gets exacerbated in firms with greater forecast error autocorrelations, suggesting that it is likely attributable to incomplete processing of earnings information by individuals.
​​​​With permission of SAGE Publishing
ISSN (Online)
2160-4061
Subject(s)
Information technology and systems
Keyword(s)
International law, cybersecurity, cyberattacks, attribution, necessity, rule of law, special emergency regime
The article deals with necessity as one of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness under customary international law and how it will likely gain relevance in view of the difficulty to quickly attribute malicious cyber operations that threaten important assets of a state. While the necessity doctrine seems fit for purpose, it lacks granularity and is problematic from an international rule-of-law point of view. Taking these pitfalls into account, the article proposes some general principles for a possible special emergency regime for cyberspace.
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Congress, ideology, influence, social capital, status
Prior research assumes that high-status actors have greater organizational influence than lower-status ones, that is, it is easier for the former to get their ideas and initiatives adopted by the organization than it is for the latter. Drawing from the literature on ideology, we posit that the status–influence link is contingent on actors’ ideological position. Specifically, status confers organizational influence to the degree that the focal actor is ideologically mainstream. The more an actor’s ideology deviates from the mainstream the less will her status translate into increased organizational influence. We find support for this hypothesis using data on the work of legislators in the House of Representatives in the United States Congress. By illuminating how and under what conditions status leads to increased influence, this study qualifies and extends current understandings of the role of status in organizations.
With permission of SAGE Publishing
Subject(s)
Entrepreneurship; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Academic entrepreneurship, patenting, incentive systems, science policy, social impact
Scholarly work seeking to understand academics’ commercial activities often draws on abstract notions of the academic reward system and of the representative scientist. Few scholars have examined whether and how scientists’ motives to engage in commercial activities differ across fields. Similarly, efforts to understand academics’ choices have focused on three self-interested motives – recognition, challenge, and money – ignoring the potential role of the desire to have an impact on others. Using panel data for a national sample of over 2,000 academics employed at U.S. institutions, we examine how the four motives are related to commercial activity, measured by patenting. We find that all four motives are correlated with patenting, but these relationships differ systematically between the life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering. These field differences are consistent with differences across fields in the rewards from commercial activities, as well as in the degree of overlap between traditional and commercializable research, which affects the opportunity costs of time spent away from “traditional” work. We discuss potential implications for policy makers, administrators, and managers as well as for future research on the scientific enterprise.
© 2019, INFORMS
Journal Article
Management Science
Stanley Baiman, Mirko S. Heinle, Richard Saouma
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Overinvestment, capital budgeting, resource allocation, information asymmetry, optimal contracting
The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm’s optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is always optimal to overinvest relative to first best, and the most efficient agent may not earn rents, even when a less efficient agent does.
© 2020, INFORMS
Journal Article
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
Santiago R. Balseiro, Ozan Candogan, Huseyin Gurkan
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Intermediary problems, mechanism design, internet advertising, extensive form games, second-price auction, multi-stage intermediation
Journal Article
Management Science
2018 POMS HOCM Best Paper Award
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Shouqiang Wang
Subject(s)
Health and environment; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Information design, bayesian persuasion game, dynamic programming, statistical decision, global health, disaster management
The World Health Organization seeks effective ways to alert its member states about global pandemics. Motivated by this challenge, we study a public agency’s problem of designing warning policies to mitigate potential disasters that occur with advance notice. The agency privately receives early information about recurring harmful events and issues warnings to induce an uninformed stakeholder to take preemptive actions. The agency’s decision to issue a warning critically depends on its reputation, which we define as the stake- holder’s belief regarding the accuracy of the agency’s information. The agency faces then a trade-off between eliciting a proper response today and maintaining its reputation in order to elicit responses to future events.
We formulate this problem as a dynamic Bayesian persuasion game, which we solve in closed form. We find that the agency sometimes strategically misrepresents its advance information about a current threat in order to cultivate its future reputation. When its reputation is sufficiently low, the agency downplays the risk and actually downplays more as its reputation improves. By contrast, when its reputation is high, the agency sometimes exaggerates the threat and exaggerates more as its reputation deteriorates. Only when its reputation is moderate does the agency send warning messages that fully disclose its private information.
Our study suggests a plausible and novel rationale for some of the false alarms or omissions observed in practice. We further test the robustness of our findings to imperfect advance information, disasters without advance notice, and heterogeneous receivers.
Copyright © 2019, INFORMS